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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2812 
 ___________ 
 
 ASSEM ABULKHAIR, 




GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States, individually and in his capacity as 
President of the United States of America; MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, individually and 
in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States; MICHAEL CHERTOFF, 
individually and his capacity as Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; UNITED 
STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; JOHN THOMPSON, 
individually and in his capacity as District Director U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Services; EMILIO GONZALEZ, individually and in his capacity as Director U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Services; ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, individually and in his 
capacity as Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; MICHAEL HAYDEN, 
individually and in his capacity as Director, Central Intelligence Agency; 
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-05410) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 20, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 












 Assem Abulkhair, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court‟s order 
granting the defendants‟ motions for summary judgment and to dismiss his amended 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Abulkhair is a native and citizen of Egypt who entered the United States as a 
visitor in 1987.  Effective February 13, 1997, he was granted status as a Lawful 
Permanent Resident.  He filed a Form N-400 Application for Naturalization on 
November 29, 2001.  Eligibility for naturalization requires the applicant to demonstrate 
that he or she has: (1) resided continuously in the United States for at least five years 
after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (2) maintained physical presence 
for at least half of the five years immediately preceding the application date; (3) resided 
in the United States from the date of the application to the time of admission to 
citizenship, and (4) established and maintained good moral character.  8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a). 
 Abulkhair‟s application stated that he had resided in Paterson, New Jersey, from 
October 1989 through March 20, 2000, and that he resided in Passaic, New Jersey, from 
March 2000 through the date of the application.  He asserted that that he had been 
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employed with PPI/Time Zero from December 28, 2000 through July 23, 2001, and that 
he was employed at Passaic Employment Services from May 2002 through the date of the 
application.  He also stated that the only time he has traveled outside the United States 
was from December 9, 1998 through February 17, 1999, when he visited family in Egypt. 
 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) interviewed 
Abulkhair on October 16, 2002.  It did not, however, adjudicate his application at that 
time.  Rather, it requested that Abulkhair provide the following documentation:  (1) his 
Egyptian passport or an affidavit from the Egyptian Consulate stating that it had retained 
the passport, as he had asserted during his interview; (2) his original United States Re-
Entry Permit; (3) proof of residence since 1996; (4) police/arrest records; and (5) original 
or certified court disposition records.  The request form noted that photocopies of the 
requested documents were not acceptable, and that the “non-existence or other 
unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility.”  It also stated 
that if the requested documents could not be obtained, the applicant “must demonstrate 
this and submit secondary evidence, such as church or school records, pertinent to the 
facts at issue.  If secondary evidence . . . cannot be obtained, the applicant . . . must 
demonstrate [this] . . . and submit two or more affidavits, sworn to or affirmed by persons 
who are not parties to the petition who have direct personal knowledge. . . . [A]ffidavits 
must overcome the unavailability of both primary and secondary evidence.” 
 In a November 6, 2002 letter to the USCIS, Abulkhair stated that he was 
attempting to comply with the document requests, submitting: (1) a letter that he had sent 
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to the Egyptian Consulate; (2) a partial copy of his expired Egyptian passport; (3) an 
affidavit (prepared by him) stating that the original Re-Entry Permit “no longer 
exist[ed];” (4) a letter from the Municipal Court of Garfield, New Jersey regarding 1991 
and 1992 court proceedings; and (5) copies of additional court proceedings. 
 On December 31, 2002, the USCIS denied Abulkhair‟s application, determining 
that he was ineligible for naturalization because he had failed to submit proof of his 
continuous residence and presence in the United States during the previous five years and 
because he had failed to prosecute the application by not providing the required 
documentation.  Thereafter, Abulkhair requested an administrative hearing pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1447(a). 
 On July 18, 2003, at Abulkhair‟s subsequent interview, the USCIS requested that, 
within thirty days, he submit “proof that he had paid income taxes to the IRS from 1996 
to 2001 (I-1722)” and “copies of cancelled checks from 1996 to the present.”  The 
request form stated that his application could not be acted upon until he submitted the 
requested documentation.  Abulkhair did not, however, fully comply with the request.  It 
appears that he did submit some documents indicating that he filed income tax returns for 
at least part of the relevant time period.  He also submitted copies of cancelled checks 
made out to a utility company and a copy of a 2003 gas bill for service at a Passaic, New 
Jersey address.  All of these documents listed Abulkhair‟s address as a Post Office Box in 
Clifton, New Jersey. 
 In the following years, Abulkhair made several requests to the USCIS for updates 
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as to the status of his application.  The USCIS responded that his application could not be 
adjudicated due to outstanding security/background checks.  Then, on September 15, 
2008, the USCIS issued a final denial of Abulkhair‟s application for naturalization.  It 
found that his application was deficient for the following reasons: (1) he failed to provide 
a passport or re-entry permit showing his travel outside the United States; (2) he failed to 
properly respond to USCIS‟s request for income tax information; and (3) the file showed 
that he did not provide original or certified court dispositions for his arrests. 
 Abulkhair then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) challenging the USCIS‟s delay in 
adjudicating his application.  On December 19, 2008, the district court dismissed the 
complaint, determining, among other things, that his claims regarding the delay in 
adjudication were moot.
1
  Abulkhair thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, 
informing the district court that he was seeking judicial review of the denial of his 
application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).   The district court granted the motion and 
                                                 
1
 We note that, to the extent that Abulkhair attempts to claim that the delay in 
processing his application for naturalization violated 8 U.S.C. § 1447, the district court 
correctly determined that any such claim is moot.  (See D.N.J. Civ. No. 08-cv-5410, Dkt. 
No. 3 (Dec. 19, 2008).)  The statute gives the district court jurisdiction over an 
application for naturalization if the USCIS fails to make a determination on the 
application within a certain time period.  8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).  The district court “may 
either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the 
[USCIS] to determine the matter.”  Id.  Here, the USCIS‟s determination of Abulkhair‟s 
application, while untimely, occurred before Abulkhair filed his complaint in the district 
court.  Accordingly, a live controversy concerning the determination of the application—
the subject matter of Section 1447—did not exist and the claim was moot.  See Int’l Bhd. 




reopened the case.  
 On May 14, 2009, Abulkhair filed an amended complaint seeking monetary 
damages for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, as well as review of the 
USCIS‟s denial of his application for naturalization.  All of his claims are premised on 
his assertion that his application was denied because he is a “Moslem living in the U.S.”  
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss as to Abulkhair‟s claims for monetary damages 
as well as a motion for summary judgment as to his claim regarding the decision to deny 
his application.  The district court granted the defendants‟ motions.  Abulkhair now 
appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the district court‟s decisions on motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), and for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56.  See, e.g., Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 
2000); DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Trust Pension Fund, 420 F.3d 220, 222 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2005); Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 A. Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
 Abulkhair seeks monetary damages from the United States, the USCIS, and the 
individual federal defendants in their official capacities for violating his constitutional 
rights by denying his naturalization application, allegedly due to his religion.  The district 
court appropriately considered, and then rejected, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 
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as providing a cause of action for this assertion.  The FTCA provides a limited exception 
to the United States‟ immunity from suit for certain tort claims.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1346(b), 2671-80.  However, to proceed on an FTCA claim in federal court, the claimant 
“shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2675(a).  Failing to follow this procedure deprives federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  White-Squire v. USPS, 592 F.3d 453, 456-58 (3d Cir. 2010).  Additionally, 
because the FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States, its 
requirements are strictly construed.  Id. at 456.  The defendants moved to dismiss 
Abulkhair‟s FTCA claim based on, among other things, his failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
 We agree that Abulkhair‟s claim, to the extent that it implicated the FTCA, was 
properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).  Abulkhair has not filed an administrative tort 
claim with the USCIS, or any federal agency, and therefore did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies before filing suit.
2
 
 B. Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
 Abulkhair also named officials in their individual capacities as defendants, 
asserting that they violated his constitutional rights pursuant to a policy of discriminating 
against Muslims who apply for naturalization.  The district court appropriately considered 
                                                 
2
 Abulkhair‟s argument that he was not required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies is meritless.  Because we affirm based on the Abulkhair‟s failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, we do not consider the other bases for the district court‟s 
dismissal of this claim. 
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these assertions as claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).   Bivens allows a plaintiff to bring a claim 
against federal officers acting under color of law for violations of that individual‟s 
constitutional rights.  Id. at 397.  However, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable 
to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 
defendant, through the official‟s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
 The defendants moved to dismiss Abulkhair‟s Bivens claims based on, among 
other things, his failure to allege any facts that the named federal defendants were 
personally involved in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.  We agree with 
the district court that Abulkhair failed to sufficiently plead a claim against any defendant 
under Bivens. 
 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, „to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Id. at 
1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “Threadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice.”  Id.   Further, to state a Bivens claim based on alleged unconstitutional 
discrimination, the petitioner “must plead sufficient factual matter to show that [a 
defendant] adopted and implemented the  . . . policies at issue not for a neutral . . . reason 




 Abulkhair did not make specific claims against any of the named defendants.
3
   
Rather, reading the complaint liberally, he appears to be asserting that the defendants 
adopted an unconstitutional policy of discrimination against Muslim applicants for 
naturalization.  As in Iqbal, Abulkhair‟s conclusory assertions against the federal officials 
have not “nudged [his] claims of invidious discrimination across the line from 
conceivable to plausible,” so as to be entitled to a presumption of truth, as is required to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 1950-51 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in 
original).  Accordingly, the district court appropriately dismissed these claims under Rule 
12(b)(6). 
 C. Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
 Abulkhair also appeals from the district court‟s decision granting the defendants‟ 
motion for summary judgment as to his claim that the USCIS erred by denying his 
application for naturalization.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).
4
  Under Section 1421(c), the 
                                                 
3 The individual federal defendants are:  George W. Bush, former President of the 
United States; Michael Mukasey, former Attorney General of the United States; Michael 
Chertoff, former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Robert S. Mueller, 
III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Michael V. Hayden, former Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency; Emilio T. Gonzalez, former director of the USCIS; 
and John Thompson, District Director of the USCIS, Newark Service Center. 
 
4
 Section 1421(c) also requires the district court, “at the request of the petitioner, 
[to] conduct a hearing de novo.”  Abulkhair contends that this precludes the district court 
from deciding the case on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without oral 
argument.  However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “apply to proceedings for 
admission to citizenship to the extent that the practice in those proceedings is not set forth 
in federal statutes and has previously conformed to the practice in civil actions.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 81(a)(3).  The Second Circuit has noted that application of the Federal Rules of 
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district court is required to review the denial of naturalization de novo and to “make its 
own findings of fact and conclusions of law.”  Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 An applicant for naturalization has the burden of establishing “by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 316.2(b).  “[T]here must be strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed 
prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.”  Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 
490, 506 (1981).  Upon filing an application for naturalization, the USCIS conducts a 
background investigation, including a review of all pertinent immigration and police 
records.  8 U.S.C. § 1446(a); 8 C.F.R. § 335.1.  Next, the applicant is interviewed and is 
also subject to an “examination” that may include testimony of witnesses in addition to 
the applicant and production of relevant books, papers, and documents.  8 U.S.C. § 
1446(b).  Upon completion of the examination and all background checks, the USCIS 
adjudicates the application.  Here, the USCIS denied Abulkhair‟s application because he 
failed to demonstrate proof of presence/residence and because he failed to prosecute his 
application. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Civil Procedure is “the norm under the current naturalization provision … and was the 
norm under the prior law.”  Chan v. Gantner, 464 F.3d 289, 296  (2d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  It then determined that the Rule 56 process provides the “the hearing required 
by section 1421(c).”  Id. at 295-96.  We agree.  Under the circumstances of this case, the 




 As stated above, Abulkhair was required to establish that he had resided 
continuously in the United States for five years after being lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, and that he had maintained “physical presence” in the United States 
for half of the five years immediately preceding the application date.   See 8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a).  Accordingly, he had to establish residence and presence in the United States 
from February 1997 through November 2001.  The term “residence,” for purposes of 
determining eligibility for naturalization, is the same as the applicant‟s “domicile, or 
principal actual dwelling place, without regard to … intent.”  8 C.F.R. § 316.5(a); see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33). 
 Abulkhair‟s application stated that he resided in Paterson, New Jersey, from 
October 1, 1989 to March 20, 2000, and that he has resided in Passaic, New Jersey, from 
March 20, 2000 to the date of the application.  In response to the USCIS‟s requests for 
documents, he provided some cancelled checks, a copy of a 2003 gas bill, some 
indication that he had filed some federal income tax returns, and various other 
documents.  However, as the district court determined, these documents did little to 
establish that Abulkhair actually resided in Paterson or Passaic because every document 
listed his mailing address as a Post Office Box in Clifton, New Jersey.  It was thus not 
error for the district court to conclude that Abulkhair had not met his burden of 
establishing that he met the continuous residence/physical presence requirements.  
Further, even if Abulkhair was unable to obtain the documents that the USCIS requested, 
there is no indication that he attempted to follow the procedures as outlined by the USCIS 
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for submitting secondary documents or affidavits to “overcome the unavailability of both 
primary and secondary evidence.” 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court appropriately granted the defendants‟ 




                                                 
5
 We have considered Abulkhair‟s remaining arguments and have determined that 
they lack sufficient merit. 
